@Green January/February 2025 | Page 14

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• COVER STORY @ green | January-February . 2025
This follows an unsuccessful tender for 3GW of offshore wind capacity , announced at the end of last year when the Danish Energy Agency disclosed that there were no bids for any of the three offshore wind farms in the North Sea offered as part of a tender called in April 2024 . In January 2025 , the tenders for the Hesselø , Kattegat II , and Kriegers Flak II projects were also cancelled . It appears new bids are being considered , including government subsidies .
• In the past month in Norway , political fractures have developed , leading to a partial collapse of the ruling coalition government . Disagreements on deciding how to respond to ( expensive ) European Union green energy measures are reported to be the root cause .
• In the US , the incoming president used his inauguration speech to focus on the importance of the fossil fuel industry whilst promptly ordering the exit of his country from the Paris Agreement , effective Jan 1 , 2026 . Following his lead , many prominent American banks formally exited the Net Zero Banking Alliance .
• It is not only the US banks that are reviewing their green goals . On Feb 20 , 2025 , Reuters reported that Europe ’ s largest bank , HSBC , was “ ditching its target of reaching net-zero carbon emissions across its business by 2030 because of slow change in the economy ”, compounding fears from clean energy campaigners that the world ’ s biggest lenders are dialling back on climate pledges . HSBC is reported to have said it was now aiming to reach its net-zero target 20 years later than planned by 2050 , and it only expects to record a 40 per cent drop in emissions across its operations , business travel and supply chains this decade . It also announced an internal review of targets on emissions linked to its loans .
• Various large oil majors are reading the macro trends as well and are also resetting climate-related goals . In 2021 , Shell unveiled its “ Powering Progress ” strategy , aimed at transforming the company into a net-zero emissions energy business by 2050 . This strategy included specific targets to reduce the net carbon intensity of its energy products by 6-8 per cent by 2023 , 20 per cent by 2030 , 45 per cent by 2035 , and ultimately achieving Net Zero by 2050 , all relative to a 2016 baseline . By 2024 , Shell adjusted its energy transition strategy in response to evolving market conditions and internal assessments . The company revised its 2030 net carbon intensity reduction target to a range of 15-20 per cent , slightly lowering the previous 20 per cent goal . Notably ,
ASEAN is one such opportunity , with 675 million people in need of modern energy infrastructure .”
Shell also abandoned its 2035 target of a 45 per cent reduction , citing uncertainties in the pace of the global energy transition and the lack of a standardised system for tracking carbon emissions . Despite these changes , the overarching goal of achieving net-zero emissions by 2050 remained central to Shell ’ s strategy . Oil major BP also recently reviewed its strategy . In 2021 , under CEO Bernard Looney , BP unveiled an ambitious energy transition plan to transform the company into a Net Zero emissions entity by 2050 . This plan included a commitment to reduce oil and gas production by 40 per cent by 2030 and significantly increase investments in renewable energy sectors . BY 2024 , under the leadership of CEO Murray Auchincloss , BP reassessed its approach in response to evolving market dynamics and investor expectations . The company abandoned its previous target of cutting oil and gas production by 25 per cent by 2030 , opting instead to focus on new investments in fossil fuel projects . Given some of the considerations presented above , it seems that we have arrived at the ‘ Net Zero dead tide ’ - a period in the Net Zero race when interest in achieving the green agenda has reached the highest point of its cycle . It comes to a temporary halt before turning and moving in the other direction ( see Figure 2 ).
WHAT ’ S GOING WRONG ?
In retrospect , the difficulties were always clear and present . Populist policies , designed to meet short-term political goals and not address logical , long-term energy security strategies necessary to safeguard the economic foundations of nations , led the way and were quickly implemented .
What was not considered in detail was the fact that subsidies , tariffs and taxes underpin the climate economics of developed nations , whilst those living in the global south , making up the majority of people living on the planet , rely on diligence , productivity and competence to earn a basic wage . Whilst the gap between the northern “ wealthy ” and the southern “ havenots ” remained wide , the chance of a smooth energy transition would be remote .
WHAT ’ S NEXT ? Wall Street tends to pre-empt Main
Street . The signal from Wall Street indicates that Energy Transition 1.0 is not financially sustainable , and a make-over is required . What could this reset – Energy 2.0 - look like ?
Regional transition groupings Many have referred to the annual United Nations Conference of the Parties ( or COP ) events as the “ mother of all greenwashing exercises ”. Thousands travel to exotic locations , and words and ideas are exchanged , but policy progress is slow , and positive actions are even more lethargic .
The COP agenda needs to be transferred to agile regional groupings of nations for faster , more appropriate , bespoke climate strategies to be devised and implemented . Working in smaller groupings allows a “ whole of society ” approach as localised initiatives will be more meaningful and impactful .
ASEAN is one such opportunity , with 675 million people in need of modern energy infrastructure .
Reliance on gas as a long-term transition fuel The past decade has affirmed that an energy mix that does not include gas or liquified natural gas ( LNG ) over the long term will not assure energy security . Investment in the continued supply of fossil fuels must be supported .
Prepare for the nuclear option The mindset of the voting public must be shaped and shifted so that nuclear options may be realistically considered when technically ready . Small modular reactors are coming of age and will soon be the only feasible clean option available to meet large-scale energy demands .
Adaptation to the fore To date , the onus has been on climate risk mitigation strategies . Going forward , climate risk considerations in urban planning policies , integrating adaptation guidelines , must be considered , particularly in emerging economies .
Less haste , more speed : Asia to lead An energy transition is not a sprint . It is , in fact , an ultra-marathon . This is a marathon fueled by adequate funding ( which generates tangible returns ) and strong leadership that walks the talk and not one that flips flops out of its commitment to the Paris Agreement .
Could the red Chinese carry the flag of the Green Brigade ? After all , there is no Net Zero if Asia , where 60 per cent of the global population resides , does not go clean and green . The Chinese political leadership model also allows long-term programmes to be driven home .
In the meantime , the tide is out . The world is confused . Will the leader of Energy Transition 2.0 please stand up ? – @ green